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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

:
:

v.

:

MAURICE N. CURTIS,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

Priority No. 2

Case No. 20000533-CA

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The State appeals from the preliminary hearing court's dismissal with prejudice of
three third degree felony drug offenses and two misdemeanor traffic violations (R. 13533, 117-116). These charges were dismissed pursuant to the trial court's order
suppressing evidence which rendered the State unable to proceed. See State v. Troyer,
866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993). This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18al(2)(a) (1999) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in deciding a contested factual issue
— whether the road where defendant was stopped was posted as a 30 m.p.h. zone
or a 40 m.p.h. zone — without hearing evidence?
A trial court's decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1408 (10th

Cir. 1998). See also Center Art Galleries-Hawaii, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 747,
753 (9th Cir. 1989).
2. Is the trial court's finding that defendant's traffic stop occurred in a 40
m.p.h. zone factually unsupported and therefore clearly erroneous?
A "bifurcated" review standard applies. The trial court's factual findings will be
reversed only for "clear error." The court's conclusions of law, however, are reviwed for
correctness, allowing some "measure of discretion" as regards the application of legal
standards to the facts. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-7-15 (1995):

A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine, a third degree felony, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1999 & Supp. 2000); possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(i) (1999 & Supp. 2000); possession of methamphetamine, a third

2

degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1999 & Supp. 2000);
driving on suspension, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §53-3227(1998); and operating motor vehicle without owner's or operator's security, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12a-302 (1998) (R. 117-116).1
Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of his
vehicle (R. 94 (motion), R. 99-95 (supporting memorandum) (copies are contained in
addendum A). The State filed a responsive memorandum (R. 112-110) (a copy is
contained in addendum B). An evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress was
scheduled for 9 November 1999 (R. 108-07) (a copy of the minute entry is contained in
addendum C). However, prior to the scheduled November hearing, the trial court sua
sponte issued a Memorandum Decision on 27 October 1999, granting the motion to
suppress (R. 115-113) (a copy is contained in addendum D). The State filed a motion
for reconsideration (R. 120-118) (a copy is contained in addendum E), which was
denied without comment on 17 December 1999 (R. 121). Thereafter, on 27 April 2000,
the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss with prejudice (R. 135-133). The
State timely appealed from the dismissal order (R. 137-136).

!

The record is numbered in reverse chronological order.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
On 6 September 1997, Deputy Shiverdecker of the Utah County Sheriffs
Department stopped defendant for speeding on the westfrontageroad, north of Lehi,
Utah (R. 99), add- B, (R. 112), add* A. Defendant was traveling 38 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h.
zone (R. 112), add. B. Defendant was unable to produce either a valid driver's license
or proof of insurance (R. I l l ) , add. B. A warrants check revealed that defendant's
driver's license was suspended, and insurance for the vehicle could not be verified (id.).
Consequently, defendant was arrested for driving on suspension and for not having his
vehicle insured (JUL). A search of his person and vehicle incident to the arrest revealed
cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and $782 cash (id.).
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the seized contraband, asserting that the
traffic stop occurred in a 40 m.p.h. zone, rather than a 30 m.p.h. zone and was thus illegal
(see R. 97-96), add. A. The State filed a responsive memorandum alleging that the
frontage road was indeed posted by sign on 6 September 1997 as a 30 m.p.h. zone, and
that it was not redesignated as a 40 m.p.h. zone until November 1997, two months after
the traffic stop (R. 112), add. B.
Although both parties anticipated that the matter would proceed to an evidentiary
hearing on 9 November 1999 (see R. 107), add. C, the trial court sua sponte decided this

2

As no evidentiary hearing was held in this matter, the State cites to the parties'
memorandums below.
4
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marked 40 m.p.h., not 30 m.p.h, (R. 115), add. D. .Based on its finding that the area was
posted as a 40 m.p.h. zone, the trial court concluded that the traffic stop was made
without reasonable suspicion of a traffic \ iolation and on that ground suppressed the
stM/rd i liilhili'iiiinil ( F I I I I I •' I i i il Il III

.

. .

• .-

SUMMARY O F THE ARGUMENT
Because the parties clearly disputed whether the frontage road was designated as a
ii ill (ill mi 4(1 m.p.h. zone, the trial court's sua sponte decision to forego the scheduled
evidentiary hoiiiif , nn the motion in suppress coiisinuir i an nil list" oil discretion.
Precisely because the parties disputed this dispositive issue an evidentiary hearing was
required to be held.
•' Addil M finally, the trial court's finding that the traffic stop occurred in a 40 m.p.h.
zone as alleged I' > lefendanl

II'IM I

I• t•

' i 1 i j i l i (M in 1 n n l l v ^ c d l n 111" .M«111"

clearly erroneous because wo evidence was adduced below. ' I he finding therefore lacks
any factual predicate.
1 lie lii'i ill

HI I, ln'jiii li,

mi mni iii1'. Iiiiiiiiijj sill I i ni ni jilll mi I IK

remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SUA
SPONTE DECIDED A DISPUTED FACTUAL ISSUE WITHOUT
ALLOWING THE PARTIES AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADDUCE
EVIDENCE AT A SCHEDULED AND ANTICIPATED HEARING
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
The trial court abused its discretion by sua sponte deciding a disputed factual
issue prior to the scheduled evidentiary hearing which both parties anticipated would be
held.
While it is not always necessary to conduct an evidentiary hearing upon the filing
of a motion to suppress evidence, it is well established that an evidentiary hearing is
required where, as here, there is a clearly disputed and dispositive factual issue. See,
e.g., United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1408 (10th Cir. 1997) (an evidentiary hearing
on a motion to suppress "is only required when the motion to suppress raise[s] factual
allegations that area-'sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to enable
the court to conclude that contested issues of fact going to the validity of the search are in
issue") (citation omitted); State v. Senecal, 497 A.2d 349, 352 (Vt. 1985) ("A hearing
on a motion is not required unless the motion papers indicate a real dispute for one or
more relevant facts") (citation omitted). See also Wylie v. State, 797 P.2d 651, 655 n.4
(Alaska App. 1990) (regarding a change of venue motion, recognizing that "[a]bsent
genuinely disputed factual issues the trial court has broad discretion to dispose of issues

6

to suppress was granted without benefit of an evidentiary hearing, even m
clearly contested defendant's claim that the traffic stop occurred in a 40 m p.h. zone (R.
]

, add. B, (see also K. I Jo-1 1 '0,p add. K. Cf. Salt Lake City Corp. v Fames
" '"i 1 I1" } 1 4,!, "I / (I hah /" i1!'!1 10SS) (I'oi i i n i i m o v m y p a n y l o

I •

successfully oppose motion for summary judgment and send the issue to fad-tindci,

.

not necessary for nonmoving party to prove its legal theory; it is only necessary for
nonmoving party to show ""facts' "' controverting the "facts" stated in moving party's
affidris in

I h< I .I

w I IIIHHOIT thi«;nf its JISCKII, i .n iHt'iiiatuiii1, mni s/. uh

deciding this dispositive issue without holding the anticipated evidentiary hearing.
POINT II
FACTUAL FINDING THAT THE TRAFFIC
STOP OCCURRED IN A 40 M.P.H. ZONE LACKS ANY FACTUAl

T H £ TRIAL C O U R r s

SUPPORT AND IS THEREFORE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
The trial court's factual finding that the traffic stop occurred in a 40 m.p.h. zone
lacks any factual predicate and is therefore clearly erroneous,
"When challenging

indings of fact of the trial court on appeal, the appellant

must show that the findings of fact were clearh

,

the appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of
fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn
lliindioiii h iiiisiiiiilllliii n ni in

ui illliii limimgs agamsl mallai I
7

Suin m Uoosman,

794 P.2d 475, 475-476 (Utah 1990). See also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding.").
Here, the only issue the parties disputed was whether the traffic stop occurred in a
30 m.p.h. zone as alleged by the State (R. 112), add. B, or in a 40 m.p.h. zone as alleged
by defendant (R.97-96), add. A. To that end, an evidentiary hearing was set for 9
November 1999 (R. 107), add. C. However, the trial court sua sponte decided this
disputed issue on 25 October 1999, without waiting to see what evidence the parties
would adduce at the anticipated evidentiary hearing (R. 115), add. D. Accordingly, no
evidence establishing that the traffic stop did or did not occur in a 40 m.p.h. zone was
adduced below. Therefore, there is no evidence to marshal. In the absence of any
factual predicate for its finding, the trial court's determination that the stop occurred in a
40 m.p.h. zone is necessarily clearly erroneous and should be overturned.

8

The trial court abused its discretion in sua sponte decidi;

1

dispositive issue without benefit of the anticipated evidentiary hearing. Consequently,
the trial court's factual finding regarding the designated speed zone is completely lacking
m n idrnluiN ^uppnil iiiiiil i lin in Inn1 Hlt/aiK rihiin mi . I hi1- L I early erroneous finding
should be overturned and this case remanded to the trial court with \i\n\ lions In in Id ,in
evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress.
RESPEC I Fl JLLYSl JBMI I I ED ff

September 2000.
JANGRAHAivi
Utah Attornev<»**

Mz
/<ZA
Af ARIAN DECKER
f Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on r £ September 2000,1 mailed a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following:
MARGARET P. LINDSAY
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & FiSPI IN
POBoxL
Provo,Utah 84603-0200

Addri icl.i

Addendum A

DAVID S. STURGILL (7995)
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
Attorneys for Defendant
245 North University Ave.
Provo, UT 84601
Telephone: 379-2570
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,

Case No. 971401338

vs.
Judge Ray M. Harding
MAURICE N. CURTIS,
Defendant.

Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Defendant Maurice Curtis,
by and through counsel, David Sturgill, Utah County Public Defenders Association, submits this
MOTION TO SUPPRESS and accompanying MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

DATED this.

day of August, 1999.

David S. Sturgill

nnQ4

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I hand delivered this
foregoing MOTION TO'SUPPRESS to the following:
Kay Bryson
Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
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day of March, 1999, a copy of the

Addendum B

<!
;

DAVID S. STURGILL (7995)
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER AS%$C2ATI§N:§ f fj
Attorneys for Defendant.
245 North University Ave.
Provo, UT 84601
Telephone: 379-2570
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 971401338

MAURICE N.CURTIS,
Judge Ray M. Harding

Defendant.

The Defendant, MAURICE CURTIS, by and through his Attorney of record, David
Sturgill, Utah County Public Defenders Association, submits this MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
FACTS1
1.

On or about September 6,1997, Deputy Shiverdecker, a Utah County Sheriff, observed
Mr. Curtis traveling northbound on the West Frontage Road, north of Lehi, near
Thanksgiving Point

2.

Deputy Shiverdecker reports that he observed Mr. Curtis traveling "at a high rate of
speed." The deputy further reports that he turned on his radar and "observed that [Mr.
Curtis's] vehicle was traveling 40 mph in a 30 zone," and "as the vehicle passed me I

The facts related in this motion are drawn exclusively from police reports and from information gathered
by Counsel for Defendant.

locked the vehicle in my radar at 38 mph." Because Deputy Shiverdecker suspected Mr.
Curtis was speeding, he decided to stop Mr. Curtis's vehicle.
3.

Mr. Curtis pulled off the West Frontage Road into the parking lot of "Fox's Landing," a
gas station and convenience store directly west of 1-15 Exit 286.

4.

Once stopped, Deputy Shiverdecker approached Mr. Curtis and requested a drivers
licence and proof of insurance. Mr. Curtis was unable to produce either document.

5.

Dispatch informed Deputy Shiverdecker that Mr. Curtis's driver's license was suspended,
and insurance for Mr. Curtis's vehicle could not be verified.

6.

Deputy Shiverdecker then arrested Mr. Curtis for driving without a license. A search of
Mr. Curtis's person and vehicle incident to arrest allegedly produced a variety of illegal
drugs and paraphernalia.
ARGUMENT

I.

ALL EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM DEFENDANTS PERSON AND VEHICLE
SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violatedf.]

The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to all
detentions, including brief, routine traffic stops. See Terry v. QhioT 392 U.S. 1,19 (1968). The
Utah Court of Appeals held: "[Shopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a
seizure within the meaning of [the Fourth] Amendment." State v. PreeceT 358 Utah Adv. Rep.
41, 43 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (guntina Delaware v PrauseT 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).

Nevertheless, a police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the officer has a
2

0098

reasonable suspicion that the person has either committed or is about to commit a public offense.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15.
The assessment of whether reasonable suspicion exists is an objective standard. The
detaining officer must, based on the totality of the circumstances, have a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting unlawful activity by the particular person detained. State v. SakesT
840 P.2d 825, 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citinv United States v. Cortex, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18
(1981).

"If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment

would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,'
only in the discretion of the police." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
In the case at bar, Deputy Shiverdecker reports that he initially detained Mr. Curtis "for
speeding." The deputy suspected Mr. Curtis was traveling 38-40 miles per hour in a 30 mile per
hour zone. Deputy Shiverdecker's suspicion that Mr. Curtis was speeding, however, was both
incorrect and unreasonable. The deputy mistakenly believed the speed limit on the West
Frontage Road was 30 miles per hour, when in fact it was, and currently is, 40 miles per hour.
The West Frontage road between Lehi and Foxes Landing distances approximately two
miles. Within that two mile distance there are currently three speed limit signs all posting 40
miles per hour as the speed limit. According to "Sign Installation & Inventory" records at the
Utah County Engineers Office, at least three of the speed limit signs have been in place since
1996, long before the traffic stop in question occurred. A photo record of the various signs
reveals they are clearly posted and unobstructed. A reasonable officer patrolling that area of
Utah County should have observed the signs and been aware of the speed limit.
Even if the speed limit signs were obstructed or missing at the time of the traffic stop,
Utah County has established a default speed limit on County roads. Unless otherwise posted,
3

County roads have a maximum speed limit of forty (40) miles per hour. See Utah County Code §
23-1-9. Law enforcement officers are presumed to know the law. A reasonable officer would be
aware of the default speed limit provided in the County Code.
Considering the totality of the circumstances facing Deputy Shiverdecker at the time he
detained Mr. Curtis (the speed limit signs and the default speed limit), the deputy's suspicion that
Mr. Curtis was speeding was unreasonable. As a result, the stop was a violation of Mr. Curtis's
Fourth Amendment right to befreefromunreasonable search and seizure. The remedy for a
violation of the Fourth Amendment is suppression of the evidence obtained during the
unconstitutional search under the exclusionary rule. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
CONCLUSION
Because Deputy Shiverdecker lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Curtis, the
subsequent searches of Mr. Curtis's person and his vehicle violated his right to befreeof
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. As a result, all evidence derived
from the illegal searches should be suppressed. For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Curtis
respectfully requests this Court grant Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
Dated this ^ S

day of August 1999.

i
David S. Sturgill
Counsel for Maurice Curtis

nnsfi

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I hand delivered, this
day of August, 1999, a copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO SUPPRESS to the following:
Kay Bryson
Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
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Addendum C
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KAY BRYSON # 0473
Utah County Attorney
CURTIS L. LARSON #6598
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, UT 84606
(801) 370-8026
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:
:

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

vs.

x

DIVISION #

MAURICE N. CURTIS

t

Case No. 971401338

:

JUDGE RAY M. HARDING SR.

Plaintiff,

Defendant(s).

9s

COMES NOW PLAINTIFF, by and through its counsel of record
Curtis L. Larson, and responds to Defendant's Motion to Suppress as
follows:

PERTINENT FACTS

1.

In September 1997, the area in which the defendant was

operating a vehicle was posted, by sign, to be a 30 mile per hour
zone.

In November 1997, the road was re-designated, by signs, to

be a 40 mile per hour zone.
2.

The defendants vehicle was stopped by officer for

traveling 38 MPH, in the 30 MPH zone.

1
r\

3.

The defendant was identified as the driver, and found to

be driving on a suspended driver's license, a Class C Misdemeanor.
The defendant was also unable to provide the officer proof of
insurance on the vehicle, a Class B Misdemeanor.
4.

The defendant was arrested for driving on suspension and

not having the vehicle insured.
5.

Search of the vehicle incident to the arrest revealed a

quantity of drugs, of varying types, and packaging, and drug
paraphernalia. $782.00 cash was also seized from the defendant at
the time of arrest.
6.

During post-Miranda questioning of the defendant, he

admitted to the officer that he knew of the drugs being present in
his vehicle.

ARGUMENT
Evidence in this matter will establish that the speed zone in
which the defendant was driving was a 30 MPH zone.

The officer's

actions were based upon his observation that a criminal act was
being perpetrated in his presence. Therefore, by statute and case
law,

the officer's

stop

of

the defendant

was based

upon a

reasonable suspicion, and "legal.19
In State v Lopez,

873 P2d 1127 (Utah 1994), the court stated:

As to the first inquiry, a police officer is constitutionally
justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is "incident to a
traffic violation committed in the officers1 presence.11 State
v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 881-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);

2
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State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). An
observed traffic violation gives the officer "at the least,
probable cause to believe the citizen had committed a traffic
offense." State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 882 n.2 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); see also United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500
(8th Cir. 1990) (holding that "when an officer observes a
traffic offense - - however minor - - he has probable cause to
stop the driver of the vehicle"); State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119,
123 (Utah 1983). An observed violation, however, is not
required. Stopping a vehicle may also be justified when the
officer has "reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver
is committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the
influence of alcohol or driving without a license . . . [or
that] the driver is engaged in more serious criminal activity,
such as transporting drugs." State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040,
1043 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616,
617-18 (Utah 1987) . In the words of the United States Supreme
Court, as long as an officer suspects that the "driver is
violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and
equipment regulations," the police officer may legally stop
the vehicle. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661. Lopez, 873 P2d at 1129.
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff requests the court deny
Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

Respectfully submitted this

b ^^ day of

1999.

Curtis L. Larson
Deputy Utah County Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed, via inter-office mail, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Response to Motion to Suppress,
to Mr. David Sturgill, Counsel for Defendant, at PD/iOffice, this
1999
sy/^ d a y of
^ ^

Addendum D

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court of
o i

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COJfl^JJ ^ % S £ f
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

' ' " ' ' ^ ^f\

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff;

CASE NO. 971401338
DATE: October 25, 1999

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

MAURICE N.CURTIS,

LAW CLERK: Gunda Jarvis
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Having received
and considered the Motion, together with memoranda in support of and opposition to the Motion,
the Court hereby grants the Motion and delivers the following Memorandum Decision.
Statement of Facts
1.

On or about September 6, 1997, Deputy Shiverdecker, a Utah County Sheriff observed
Mr. Curtis traveling northbound on the West Frontage Road, north of Lehi, near
Thanksgiving Point.

2.

The posted speed limit on thefrontageroad was 40 miles per hour.

3.

Deputy Shiverdecker reports that, according to the radar gun, Mr. Curtis was traveling 3 840 miles per hour.

4.

The deputy stopped Mr. Curtis' vehicle for speeding under the belief that the speed limit
was 30 miles per hour.

5.

Mr. Curtis pulled off the West Frontage Road into the paiidng lot of "Fox's Landing," a
gas station and convenience store directly west of I-IS Exit 286.

6.

Once stopped, Deputy Shiverdecker approached Mr. Curtis and requested a driver's license
and proof of insurance. Mr. Curtis was unable to produce either document.

7.

Dispatch informed Deputy Shiverdecker that Mr. Curtis' driver's license was suspended,
and insurance for Mr. Curtis' vehicle could not be verified.
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8.

Deputy Shiverdecker then arrested Mr. Curtis for driving without a license. A search of
Mr. Curtis' person and vehicle incident to arrest allegedly produced a variety of illegal
drugs and paraphernalia.
Ruling
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "the right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and efifects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CONST, amend. IV; see also UTAH CONST, art. I, § 12. The
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment include brie£ routine traffic stops. Terrv v. Ohio.
392 U.S. 1,19(1968). In Utah, an officer is constitutionallyjustified in stopping a vehicle if the stop
is "incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence." State v. Talbot 792 P.2d 489,
491 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); or if the oflBcer has reasonable suspicion that the person has either
committed or is about to commit a public offense. £$$ Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15.
The assessment of whether reasonable suspicion exists is an objective standard. The
detaining oflBcer must, based on the totality of the circumstances, have a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting unlawful activity by the particular person detained. State v. Sakes. 840 P.2d 825,
838 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
In the case at bar, Deputy Shiverdecker did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity on the part of the defendant to justify detaining him. The deputy's suspicion that Mr. Curtis
was speeding was incorrect and unreasonable due to the feet that Mr. Curtis was going 38 MPH in
a 40 MPH zone. Therefore, Deputy Shiverdecker9s actions violated Mr. Curtis's Fourth Amendment
right to befreefromunreasonable searches and seizures. Accordingly, the evidence obtained during
the unconstitutional detention and search must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

Order
Due to the fact that Deputy Shiverdecker did not have an articulable, reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity, the defendant was wrongfully detained and the subsequent searches ofMr. Curtis'
person and vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, all evidence discovered during
the search must be suppressed. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby granted.
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order withinl 5 days of this decision consistent with the terms
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of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission
to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no eflfect until such order is signed by the
Court.
DATED this *L7

cc:

day of October, 1999.
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Curtis L. Larson, Deputy Utah County Attorney
David S. Sturgill, Attorney for Defendant
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